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"Human Dignity as High Moral Status"HUMAN DIGNITY AS HIGH MORAL STATUS1
MANUEL TOSCANO
UNIVERSIDAD DE MÁLAGA
ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically re-
levant sense. Following recent works,we can find some important clues in the long his-
toryoftheterm.Traditionally,dignityconveystheideaofahighandhonourableposition
in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem
more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity,especially in regard to
humanrights.However,anaccount ofdignityashighrankprovidesanilluminatingpers-
pective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to pre-
serve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral
status,towhichsomemoralphilosophershavepaidattentioninrecent years.Iexplorethe
possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity
and its close relationship with human rights.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article défend la thèse que l'idée de la dignité humaine a un sens précis et philoso-
phiquement pertinent. À la suite de travaux récents, il est possible de trouver des mo-
ments-clésimportantsdanslalonguehistoiredecetteidée.Traditionnellement,ladignité
exprimel'idéed'unepositionhauteet honorabledansunordrehiérarchique,soit dansla
société ou dans la nature. À première vue, rien ne semble plus contraire à la conception
contemporaine de la dignité humaine, en particulier en ce qui concerne les droits de
l'homme.Toutefois,une explication de la dignité comme rang élevé offre un éclaircisse-
mentsurlerôlequ'ellejouedanslediscourségalitairedesdroitsdel'homme.Afindepré-
servercesensrelationnelconcernant ladignitéhumaine,nouspouvonsutiliserlanotion
de statut moral, à laquelle certains philosophes de la morale ont accordé une attention
soutenue ces dernières années. J'explore les possibilités de l'idée de statut moral pour
mieux comprendre la dignité humaine et sa relation étroite avec les droits de l'homme.
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1Since the Second World War, human dignity has become a leading idea widely
used in moral, legal and political arguments. More than anything else, this promi-
nence is due to its close association with human rights. Despite its philosophical
pedigree, such influence would be incomprehensible if the concept of human dig-
nity did not appear in major international human rights documents, from the Char-
ter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on.
As with human rights, the appeal to human dignity has become common in pub-
lic debates, in some cases as a formulaic invocation, in others as a powerful
rhetorical device. Of course, the inflationary use ends up having deleterious ef-
fects on the meaning of words.Thus, the notion of human dignity may sound like
a platitude, or be regarded as “mere decoration”, just a “fine-sounding phrase”.2
Moreover, in recent years the use of the concept has generated much contro-
versy. To critics, appeals to human dignity represent vague statements, or a re-
sort to a mere slogan without a fixed content, useless for normative theory. As
we shall see, much of this controversy has taken place in bioethics, but the issues
raised are pertinent for the use of the term “human dignity” in the theory and
practice of human rights.
Among the criticisms, I would like to address the objection about the vacuity of
the notion.3 For this task we must begin by looking at the long history of the
term, which provides some interesting clues.Traditionally, dignitas conveys the
idea of a high and honourable rank in a hierarchical order, either in society or in
nature. That old hierarchical meaning strikes us as just the opposite of the con-
temporary conception of human dignity in human rights talk. Nevertheless, an
account of human dignity as high rank offers a promising viewpoint on the use
of the notion in the egalitarian framework of human rights.
In order to preserve that relational sense of human dignity, we can use the no-
tion of moral status, to which some moral philosophers have paid attention lately.
Analogous to legal status, moral status is defined as the rights and obligations
assigned to someone by moral argument, not by law.The moral status of human
beings determines how it is morally justified to treat them, or what is morally
permissible to do to human beings. So the notion of human dignity should be un-
derstood as a high moral status consisting of a set of rights that guarantees a
high degree of inviolability and respect.
The article has three parts. Part I is introductory and consists of two sections. In
the first, I will consider briefly the use of the term “dignity” in international
legal instruments on human rights. Such use raises some puzzling questions con-
cerning the lack of normative meaning of the word and the symbolic role as-
signed to it. In the second section, I offer a quick survey of recent critical views
about the notion of dignity in bioethical discussions.These criticisms are a good
reason to look more closely at its meaning and role in moral arguments.
There are two sections in part II. In the first, I will discuss two conceptions of
dignity, known as “restricted” and “universal”, usually differentiated in the spe-
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1cialized literature. One can be traced back to its origins in the Roman notion of
dignitas as high rank or office, while the other leads to the contemporary un-
derstanding of dignity as the inherent worth of human beings. I argue that this
contrast provides a very inaccurate historical overview and that we should take
into account what Oliver Sensen calls the “traditional paradigm”. In the second
section, I give an account of this traditional conception of dignity concerning
the high place of man in nature.According to this perfectionist view, human dig-
nity is regarded first and foremost as the ground for duties.
Part III consists of three sections. In the first, I consider Jeremy Waldron’s hy-
pothesis, according to which the traditional sense of dignity as high rank offers
ap r o m i s i n ga p p r o a c ht ou n d e r s t a n dt h ec r i t i c a lc o n t r i b u t i o no fh u m a nd i g n i t yt o
the theory and practice of human rights. The last two sections explore the ad-
vantages and implications of understanding human dignity as (high) moral sta-
tus, resting on rights and duties, and not as a special kind of value. On the one
hand, its moral significance as a moral status remains unsettled and open to de-
bate between opposing interpretations, as the resurgence of the traditional par-
adigm reveals. On the other, taking dignity as a moral status raises the question
about how it relates to human rights and whether it can be seen as their ground.
I
1.HUMAN RIGHTS
Certainly the moral, political and legal significance of the idea of dignity in our
time is inseparable from its association with human rights. After the Second
World War, the phrase “human dignity” appears on the main international human
rights documents. For example, in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Na-
tions (1945), where in the name of the peoples of the United Nations it is pro-
claimed “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small”.4
It has definitely been the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948)
that has done most to popularize the use of dignity in human rights discourse.
At the UDHR the phrase appears five times: twice in the Preamble (“Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world”) and in three articles (article 1: “All human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights”; and also in articles 22 and 23 about socio-economic
rights).5 Following the UDHR, the mention of dignity has become commonplace
in international human rights law and humanitarian law.6
The overwhelming use of dignity language in international law instruments
shows a remarkable degree of consistency.7At least the same formulas are ritu-
ally invoked.There are some noteworthy points about this use. First, human dig-
nity is closely related to human rights as a separate but interdependent concept,
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while “dignity” and the “worth of persons”, both used with the adjective “in-
herent”, are taken as mere synonyms.
Second, the relationship between human rights and dignity is left unexplained in
the UDHR and other texts; simply they are mentioned on equal footing, just con-
nected by a coordinating conjunction. Only later in the Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) the kind of
relation between the two notions is explicitly formulated: “Recognizing that these
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Of course, this
represents a major move whose significance should not be overlooked. It estab-
lishes a priority in the order of justification. Dignity is assigned a foundational
role in human rights discourse as the ground for human rights.8
And third, there is no definition of human dignity in declarations, treaties and
other international human rights instruments. Its meaning is simply left to an in-
tuitive understanding, assuming that everyone knows roughly what it is.9 But is
this a reliable assumption?
Needless to say, this kind of legal texts is not intended to address theoretical dis-
cussions on concepts and there may be sound political reasons to avoid them in
order to achieve the widest possible international consensus on human rights.
But the problem is how to reconcile this lack of clarity about the meaning of
dignity with the justificatory burden assigned to the concept in relation to human
rights, according to which people have rights because they have dignity. The
problem is serious because there are widespread suspicions in contemporary de-
bates about the meaninglessness of the term, as we shall see.
But even this may be seen as an advantage.The case is well described by Doron
Shultziner, who explains the two features of human dignity as it is used for jus-
tifying rights in legal documents: the symbolic role and the lack of fixed content.
By symbolic role, he understands that human dignity seems to offer a firm start-
ing point for would-be universal legislation. But it does not really determine the
content of this ultimate rationale, thus leaving the philosophical question open.
Otherwise, human dignity works as a symbolic label, open to different interpre-
tations. For that reason it is a rhetorical device useful for justifying political
agreements concerning human rights “on a seemingly shared ground”.10 Obvi-
ously, the price for playing that role is the lack of definite meaning. In fact, the
content changes depending on the political agreements reached at different
times. And this versatility is possible because “there is not fixed or universal
content that spouts out of human dignity”.11
So considered, human dignity seems to be just a political expedient. From this
point of view, what matters is the undeniable rhetorical force of the phrase
“human dignity”, suitable for concealing disagreements under the guise of an al-
leged common ground. Moreover, this rhetorical effect seems to be directly
linked to the absence of critical examination: “Few expressions call forth the
nod of assent and put an end to analysis as readily as ‘the dignity of man’. It
7sounds wholesome and real, and its utterance easily quiets our critical facul-
ties”.12 This is a disturbing conclusion, to say the least, and completely unsatis-
factory in philosophical terms. Is the vacuity of the concept of dignity, or the
restraint on critical scrutiny about it, the price to pay for consensus? It would be
a shaky consensus indeed. Expediency cannot stop critical inquiry on this issue,
especially taking into account what is happening with the idea of dignity in
bioethics.
2. BIOETHICS
In recent years, human dignity has been the subject of intense controversy in
bioethics debates.The term became popular in the seventies in connection with
the discussion of life prolonging medical treatment and what was called “death
with dignity”. But it is interesting to recall that, for example, it does not appear
in the Belmont Report (1979), which sets out the major ethical principles for the
discussion in bioethics.13 In the last years, however, the concept has been also
used in debates on biomedical innovations, especially those concerning human
genetics, modes of assisted reproduction and enhancement techniques. By the
way, the US President’s Council on Bioethics, an advisory panel of experts cre-
ated by George W. Bush in 2001, played a decisive role in placing the issue of
dignity at the center of those debates.14 In fact, the Council’s first report, issued
in 2002, was titled Human Cloning and Human Dignity.
Right away, the concept of dignity as applied to bioethics was fiercely ques-
tioned.The following year bioethicist Ruth Macklin developed a keen criticism
as an editorial of the British Medical Journal.O fc o u r s e ,h e rd i s c u s s i o nw a sl i m -
ited exclusively to medical ethics, but it is interesting to note that it represented,
and it still represents, a strong denunciation of the widespread use of the concept
and its normative futility:
“Is dignity a useful concept for an ethical analysis of medical
activities?A close inspection of leading examples shows that
appeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other, more
precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an under-
standing of the topic”.15
In other words, the argument assumes, we can get rid of this concept without any
real loss. Macklin severely criticizes the first report of the US President’s Council
on Bioethics by constantly appealing to dignity without providing an analysis of it
or explaining how it is related to other ethical concepts and principles. Given the
lack of criteria about its meaning, “the concept remains hopelessly vague”.16 In
other cases, as she shows, the references to human dignity can be replaced easily
by the principle of respect for persons or their autonomy, one of the traditional prin-
ciples of bioethics. In short, Macklin confronts us with the following alternative
abouttheuseofdignity:eitheritisanemptysloganoritismerelyredundant.17One
cannot help but wonder whether Macklin’s criticism can be pertinent outside
bioethics.
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1Dieter Birnbacher, among others, has expressed similar concerns about the use
of the idea of human dignity in European biomedical debates.As normative prin-
ciple, it has played a more important role than in Anglophone bioethics, but its
inflationary use provokes a similar reaction of intellectual discomfort and raises
similar questions to those already mentioned. Birnbacher holds two major ob-
jections against it. As expected, the first alludes to the suspicion about the lack
of meaning:
“Partly it is due to the unclarities and ambiguities of the concept
itself,invitingthesuspicionthatMenschenwürdefunctionsmore
as a ‘Leerformel’withnofixedcontentofitsown,lendingitself
to a merely rhetorical and opportunistic application”.18
The second has to do with the rigid and stubborn way in which the rhetorical
force of the phrase is usually used:
“Menschenwürde is typically invoked, both by ethicists and
lawyers,asakindofultimatearticleoffaithratherthanasaprin-
ciple open to rational debate. It typically functions as a ‘conver-
sational stopper’ settling an issue and tolerating no further
discussion”.19
Again, the discussion is limited to bioethics. But it is worth noting that there is
an e a r - p e r f e c tf i tb e t w e e nb o t ho b j e c t i o n sa n dt h et w of e a t u r e si d e n t i f i e db y
Shultziner regarding the use of human dignity in the international legal instru-
ments on human rights. Human dignity is regarded as an empty label, and yet
supposedly apt to block rational debate. Understandably, critics as Birnbacher or
Macklin present these two features under an unfavourable light.
II
3.TWO CONCEPTIONS OF DIGNITY
We can start by asking if it is truly impossible to find something like a fixed
content in the uses of dignity, or at least some lines of continuity through its his-
torical layers of meaning. For if we look at the history of the term we can find
two different senses of dignity, which have been labelled as restricted and uni-
versal.20 In fact, the history of the term is usually told as the relation between
these two meanings, and how and when the former, restricted sense evolved into
the second, universalistic one. Of course, my aim here is not to trace the history
of the term “dignity”, but just to look for some clues to better understand its cur-
rent use in the moral and political arguments.21
The origin of the restricted sense of dignity can be traced to its roots in ancient
Rome. For the Romans, dignitas was a complex idea referring to the superiority
and distinction of a high social position or rank. It was identified with political
offices and persons holding them; for instance, a senator, or a consul, had dig-
nitas. As expected, it was an intensely hierarchical notion closely linked to ho-
nour, privileges and deference due to high office or rank.
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1Therefore, we have to take it properly as a high status, determining distinctions
between individuals and how they should be treated. So understood as a posi-
tional good, only a few in an elevated position could have dignity. Being exclu-
sive, it was sought and fought zealously in Roman political life, as the case of
Julius Caesar shows, because this kind of dignity could be gained, for example,
by appointment to public office, but also lost.
It is important to notice that the dignity of a high position entailed obligations
for those holding it: “The office or rank related to dignitas carried with it the ob-
ligation to fulfil the duties proper to the rank.Thus ‘decorum’understood as ap-
propriate dignified behaviour, was expected of the person holding the office”.22
This close association with decorum and gravitas is a key point to understand the
traditional usage, because dignity is manifested in public behaviour. In that sense,
noble bearing, self-control and manners are the outer aspects of dignity.
This old hierarchical conception has had a long life after the demise of the
Roman world and the traces are still present in our dictionaries.To give one ex-
ample, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) maintains
the use of “dignities” as public offices, even if the text is claiming for the equal-
ity of all citizens in the access to them:
“All citizens, being equal in its eyes, are equally eligible to all
public dignities, places, and employments, according to their
capacities, and without other distinction than that of their
virtues and talents” (article 6).23
This usage referred to high offices and people who occupy these honorary po-
sitions is alive in the old-fashioned parlance about “dignitaries” in official cer-
emonies or ecclesiastic “dignities” in the Church. Naturally we keep talking of
“dignified behaviour” in relation to the mode of conduct and self-presentation
in social life, as recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary: “Nobility or befit-
ting elevation of aspect, manner and style; becoming or fit stateliness, gravity”.
And, of course, the close relationship of honour and public esteem with a high
rank or office is a topic that can be found in classic political texts.24
The universal meaning of dignity is completely different and is usually defined
by opposition to this hierarchical and exclusive conception. In this sense, dignity
is not something linked to a higher social rank or political position, or exclusive
of a few men. Rather, it is a type of value that belongs to everyone as a human
being, regardless of his or her social status and institutional position. Moreover,
this value is seen as something given, an endowment, not something acquired or
conquered; therefore, it cannot be lost or removed.25 Finally, it is a kind of value
that does not support scales or grades, so that every human being has the same
equal worth.
This conception of dignity is perfectly suited to the discourse about human rights,
unlike the other. Under the influence of Kant, or some of his influential readings,
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1the term “dignity” has become shorthand for “the inherent worth of human
being”. Regarded as a value, it is typically described with adjectives as “inher-
ent”, “intrinsic”, “inner”, “absolute” or “incomparable”. These adjectives ex-
press the essential character, not contingent or dependent on external
circumstances, of dignity as a value that human beings have by virtue of their
being human. As such, all human beings have it and each of them equally, re-
gardless of social circumstances or personal achievements. Obviously, it fits
nicely the universalistic and egalitarian spirit of the contemporary discourse on
human rights.
We should highlight some philosophical aspects of this universal, currently
prevalent, conception of dignity. First, the attribution of this inherent, inner, ab-
solute or essential value to human beings, just for being human, sounds like an
ontological claim. Indeed, that is exactly what it is, the assertion of a moral fact
about the kind of value we can find in the world: human beings are valuable in
themselves, each one having a worth different from anything else; and they have
this great value because of some defining features of their common humanity.
Second, this ontological claim is usually understood as a perfect instance of what
Teresa Iglesias calls “bedrock truths”, “because they have to be acknowledged
–they cannot be proved”.26 Thus it plays a basic role in some ethical normative
theories and Christian and humanist views of common morality. According to
them, the core of morality is respect for persons.27 But why should we respect
people? Naturally, the answer lies in the bedrock truth about the inherent value
possessed by all human beings as such. In other words, people have dignity and
dignity, understood as the inherent worth that people have, is the ultimate reason
that justifies the way in which it is permissible to treat them.Accordingly, if we
assume that morality is concerned with respecting people, the ontological claim
about human worth seems to be the ground upon which the entire edifice of
morality rests. So considered, the moral fact of human dignity amounts to the
final reason in the moral order and the underpinning for human rights.
4.THETRADITIONAL PARADIGM
In the literature on dignity it is very common to contrast both conceptions of
dignity. But that gives a distorted historical view, overly simple, in which it is
easy to overlook important elements. Inevitably it raises questions, for example,
about the historical origins of the so-called universal conception; or about the
change of the old hierarchical meaning of dignity as high rank or status into
something so different, if not opposed.
According to one standard account, the origin of the universal conception of dig-
nity lies in the biblical sources of Jewish and Christian thought, particularly in
the theological view of man as created in God’s image (imago Dei). For those
seeking secular sources, the topic of human dignity became central in the Euro-
pean Enlightenment and the real turning point for the modern understanding of
the concept of dignity is to be found in Kant’s philosophical writings. But this
is still historically inaccurate, since the dignitas hominis was a classical theme
developed by the Stoics and particularly by Cicero.28
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1However, although these classical authors attributed dignity to all humankind, it
would be a gross misunderstanding to assimilate their view to the contemporary
conception set out in the previous paragraphs. For this reason Oliver Sensen has
distinguished carefully what he calls “the traditional paradigm” from the con-
temporary understanding of human dignity, but also from the restricted social
sense of the “archaic paradigm”, as he calls it.29The traditional view is developed
from the hierarchical conception of dignitas as a high rank, but universalizing it
to all human beings. In fact, it preserves the hierarchical meaning of dignity, but
displacing it from society to the natural order: it is a way of talking about man’s
place in the cosmos, stressing that man is in a superior position, elevated above
all other natural beings.30
This move was possible, according to the metaphysical tradition, because both
the world and society were conceived as hierarchical orders.Thus human dignity
meant the high rank man holds within the hierarchy of beings in the world.As a
result, this traditional view also preserves the overtones of esteem and respect
due to such honourable position.The reason why man occupies that elevated po-
sition is to be found in certain defining features of human nature, mainly reason
and free will. This is the characteristic pattern of the traditional conception of
dignity, as Sensen explains:
“The same basic structure can be found from Cicero onwards
in Christian and Renaissance thinkers: Human beings are spe-
cial in nature in virtue of a certain capacity (e.g. reason, free-
dom), and have a duty to make a proper use of it”.31
It is important to notice here a first significant difference with respect to the con-
temporary concept of dignity outlined above. Nowadays, we are accustomed to
associate dignity with rights; in the traditional paradigm, however, dignity is re-
garded as the ground of duties, not of rights. In this regard the traditional para-
digm is also akin to the old Roman sense of dignity as a high social rank that
carries obligations with it. Noblesse oblige is the idea in both cases: one is
obliged to behave in an appropriate manner, because of the honourable position
one occupies. Understood as nobility in the natural order, human dignity requires
men to behave according to their nature as rational and free beings, without
stooping to the animal condition.32
At this point there is another element of contrast with the contemporary con-
ception of dignity, because the traditional paradigm “is a perfectionist frame-
work which expresses the duty to make a proper use of one’s own capacities”.33
If the first duty is to make an appropriate use of attributes of human nature like
reason or free will, this amounts to an obligation to preserve and respect our
own dignity. So, dignity is focused on the agent and the duties associated with
it are considered as agent-centred.They are not duties we owe to others, as in the
case of rights, but first and foremost duties to ourselves.
There is a third feature in the traditional view of dignity related to this perfec-
tionist framework. Under its contemporary sense, dignity is taken as a value that
people have, no matter what they do. They cannot increase it or waste it; sim-
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1ply they have it as human beings, irrespective of their behaviour. The tradi-
tional view is more complex, since it recognizes two stages in dignity. All
human beings occupy the same rank in the world order because of the common
attributes of human nature, but only those who fulfil the duty to make a good
use of them fully realize their dignity. So to speak, there are two grades within
the same rank.
Undoubtedly, the key point of divergence lies in the very way of conceiving
dignity. In the contemporary usage, it is a value-property that human beings
have as such, unrelated to anything else; that is, a non-relational attribute. By
contrast, in the traditional paradigm dignity keeps the sense of a relational
property,34 suggesting the upper echelons of a hierarchy, and thus superiority
and subordination. Literally, it expresses the elevation of one thing above oth-
ers, so that the elevation brings distinction, nobility or excellence.With this re-
lational meaning in mind, dignity can be applied to different things or
activities, not just to human beings. For example, we can speak of the dignity
of philosophy in order to raise it as a noble activity above others. In this sense,
Kant spoke of the dignity of morality; the labour movements in the nineteenth
century clamoured for the dignity of work; or at present we hear about the dig-
nity of parliament, the dignity of the medical profession, the dignity of lan-
guages, and so on.
III
5.WALDRON’S HYPOTHESIS
This relational sense is an important key to understanding the rhetorical use of the
term and its evolution. It is easy to see how the idea of a high rank was transferred
from society to nature, both regarded as hierarchical orders. At first glance, how-
ever, the traditional hierarchical view seems to clash with the egalitarian spirit of the
contemporary usage. But maybe not, all things considered. While the old Roman
conceptreferredtothesuperiorsocialpositionofsomemenoverothers,andhence
was radically anti-egalitarian, the traditional view presented man’s place in the cos-
mos as a higher rank, above all other natural beings. In this traditional view of the
world, all natural creatures are subordinated to mankind, but all men belong to the
same high rank.B ys h a r i n gt h es a m eh i g hs t a t u si nt h en a t u r a lw o r l d ,a l lm e nh a v e
the distinction and nobility that corresponds to that elevated position, therefore de-
serving the same esteem and honours.
It is true that this is framed in a metaphysical or theological picture of the
world. But we cannot underestimate the political consequences of bringing
back to society this idea of the high rank of man in God’s creation. Indeed, the
major effect of dignity applied to humankind is to elevate and ennoble men, all
of them. If by nature men are entitled to the honour and deference due to such
elevated rank, it is inevitable to draw conclusions about how human beings are
treated in society and how they should be treated according to such high posi-
tion. Historically it was so in modern political thought.The idea of mankind’s dig-
1
3
V
O
L
U
M
E
6
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
A
U
T
O
M
N
E
/
F
A
L
L
2
0
1
1nity, understood as noble rank in the natural world, challenged the established so-
cial order and the relations of domination and subordination between men.
In the same vein, the potential to articulate an egalitarian approach was available
in the traditional view of human dignity: If all men share by nature the same
rank, being equal in nobility or excellence, how can we justify the huge in-
equalities in society?35 Paradoxically, the hierarchical conception of the world
provided ammunition for a more egalitarian society inasmuch as these differ-
ences in the natural order rank enhanced equality in the same rank shared for all
human beings.This is a story well known and I will not dwell on it. Simply, we
have to bear in mind this line of progression from the traditional paradigm to
the contemporary, egalitarian sense of dignity.
Nevertheless, there is a point worthy of attention about this evolution. As Je-
remy Waldron points out, the sense of equality related to human dignity is up-
wards, meaning equality in sharing the same high, noble rank. This is a crucial
issue.As he suggests, that should be considered the essential contribution of the
idea of human dignity to the modern egalitarian discourse. In his words:
“[…] The distinctive contribution that ‘dignity’ makes to
human rights discourse is associated, paradoxically, with the
idea of rank: once associated with hierarchical differentiations
of rank and status, ‘dignity’ now conveys the idea that all
human persons belong to the same rank and that rank is very
high indeed”.36
I’ll call it the “Waldron’s hypothesis”. It is an interpretative proposal about how
we can better understand the use of the term37.R e c a l l i n gt h eo l dr e s t r i c t e dm e a n -
ing of dignitas as high social status, he takes the contemporary usage as claim-
ing to universalize that high rank to all human beings. If we examine the
hypothesis, Waldron seeks to rescue the traditional association between dignity
and high rank; but he places such a high position again back in society; and last,
that high social status has to be allocated in an egalitarian and universalistic way,
i.e., to all persons alike. In other words, we need to gain some historical per-
spective regarding the contemporary use of the concept of dignity, understand-
ing it as an egalitarian transformation derived from the old socially-exclusive
sense; an egalitarian drift, as we could add, in which the traditional paradigm
has historically played a key role.
The point ofWaldron’s proposal is to recover the idea of high social rank for the
egalitarian discourse on human rights. Paradoxical as it may sound, the sugges-
tion is really attractive.At first glance it seems paradoxical because the discourse
of human rights is based precisely on the denial of differences in rank between
humans beings. This is usually understood as the abolition of ranks in demo-
cratic societies. But Waldron’s hypothesis is subtler. It suggests that our demo-
cratic societies are not organized as societies without ranks, but as societies in
which everyone belongs to the same high social rank. It may look similar, but the
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1difference is significant when thinking about the kind of social equality that we
seek. Rather than abolish nobility, it aims to extend it to all members of society. So
everyone should be treated according to the highest standards of respect and def-
erence due formerly to a few men.The language of dignity just marks that differ-
ence: Instead of lowering the noble to the condition of the common man, as the
elimination of ranks seems to suggest, it elevates the common man to a noble po-
sition. In short, it represents nobility for the common man, asWaldron puts it.38 He
thinks that this hypothesis offers a very promising approach for thinking about the
rights we enjoy in democratic societies.
Waldron’s proposal can be supported for instance by the work of the jurist James
Q. Whitman. Whitman has studied the differences in the legal cultures of conti-
nental Europe and the United States, emphasizingthe role that dignity plays in the
European legal systems, notably in France and Germany. His research offers a
broader sociological perspective, taking into account both laws and social practices,
to examine what he calls “everyday social forms of dignity”. Moreover, according
to Whitman, the contemporary social forms of dignity should be understood in
historical perspective, as the result of a history that goes back to the ancien régime
in Europe. His main historical claim fits in perfectly with Waldron’s hypothesis:
“Human dignity’as contemporary Europeans embrace it in con-
tinental Europe has been shaped by a rich and complex collec-
tive memory of the obnoxious past of the old regime.The core
idea is that old forms of low-status treatment are no longer ac-
ceptable. […] ‘Human dignity’, as we find it on the continent
today, has been formed by a pattern of levelling up, by an ex-
tension of formerly high-status treatment to all sectors of the
population”.39
So, the language of human dignity cannot be understood without realizing how it
has evolved from the old hierarchical sense of dignity as high social rank. In aris-
tocratic times, the main institutions of dignity were institutions of privilege meant
to secure rights and better forms of treatment for high-rank persons. In line with
Waldron, Whitman argues that such history cannot be interpreted simply as the
mere elimination of social ranks and privileges in Europe’s modern democratic
societies. If so, that would amount to an egalitarian society with no favour or spe-
cial treatment for high-status people. But whatWhitman discovers in his research
on the idea of dignity in European laws and institutions, especially in the case of
criminal law, is just the opposite pattern:The rejection and progressive elimination
of old forms of low-status treatment.Again, the point of the idea of human dignity
is that everyone has a high rank and should receive a respectful and dignified treat-
ment corresponding to that elevated status. It means high-status egalitarianism.
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16.MORAL STATUS AND CONSTRAINTS
Is the concept of human dignity too nebulous or vacuous to serve as the firm
ground for human rights, as some critics claim?The brief review of the history of
the term reveals instead a thick concept carrying a complex historical background.
Drawing on this complex past,Waldron uses the ideas of high rank and nobility to
provide an illuminating account for the use of the notion of human dignity in
human rights discourse. His hypothesis is an invitation to see in a refreshing way
the rights we take for granted, considering them as the old privileges of nobility
now universalized. In a nutshell, he draws our attention to the core meaning of
dignity as elevated status.
Engaging as it is, his account leaves some interesting questions open. Actually,
Waldron goes no further discussing the notion of status, surely because he takes it
to be clear enough in a legal sense; and for him status is a legal concept.Accord-
ingly, the notion of dignity is at home in the law, as he says, being imported from
its natural habitat to moral discourse. And, oddly enough, in his Tanner Lectures
Waldron regards dignity as a philosophical artefact playing a constructive role in
moral thinking, but “not a term that crops up much in ordinary moral conversa-
tion”.40 But is dignity a term of art? Indeed, this is a striking statement when one
sees the ease with which lay people use the term in everyday talk or in political dis-
courses, and how often41.
Certainly, the concept of status deserves further attention. Some lessons can be
drawn regarding our current understanding of human dignity. Moreover, to make
sense of the use of dignity in ordinary language and in human rights discourse we
should turn to the idea of status as a moral concept, not just a legal notion. Al-
though recognized in national constitutions and international human rights law,
human dignity as a kind of status is not only a creature of law, so to speak. It fig-
ures in moral claims when people feel mistreated or in moral arguments for criti-
cally assessing laws, policies or customs. As a matter of fact, many advocates of
human rights take human dignity as something that should be recognized by law,
though not created by law. Fortunately, the idea of moral status has drawn in-
creasing attention in recent ethical theory and the works of some leading moral
philosophers, as Frances Kamm,Thomas Nagel orAllen Buchanan, provide fruit-
ful discussions.
What is a moralstatus?Broadly defined, the status of an entity is a normativecon-
dition that determines how this entity should be treated. Obviously, the status in
question depends on the kind of normative system that establishes how the entity
should be treated. Think of the legal status of X, where X is an agent or class of
agents: it is the normative position of X as defined through the prerogatives or du-
ties the law assigns to X. National citizenship is an obvious example of legal sta-
tus today. By contrast, moral status can be defined as how it is morally justified to
treat X; or, in the words of Frances Kamm, what is morally permissible or imper-
missible to do to X.42
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1So understood, moral status is a normative notion stricto sensu,s i n c ei th a st ob e
spelled out in deontic terms as permissions, prohibitions and obligations. A no-
ticeable consequence follows from stressing this normative character: the usual
description of human dignity as the inherent value of human beings is not accu-
rate enough. Conceived as a (high) moral status, it cannot be the formula for a
kindofvalue,nomatterhowprecious,atleastnotdirectlyasitisusuallyassumed
in contemporary usage. Some things do not fit that description.Take for instance
af a m i l i a rf e a t u r eo fa x i o l o g i c a lt e rm s :t h e i rgr a d a b i l i t y . 43Value concepts, unlike
deontic concepts, can take the form of gradable adjectives, which support both
their comparative use and the presence of a submodifier. Traditionally this was
the case with “dignified”.Yet the contemporary use of “human dignity” seems
to break with this pattern. Understood as the inherent and exclusive worth of
human beings, it is a unique kind of value for which there can be no comparisons
or differences in degree.There cannot be little, enough or too much human dig-
nity in a person, nor do some people have more than others, since it is assumed
that every human being has exactly the same worth.
It might seem that there is a contradiction here, as we present human dignity as
higher status, that is, using it in a comparative sense. Of course, status is defi-
nitely a comparative notion.44 As we have seen, there may be higher and lower
status. Indeed, this is why the notion is recommended to us, suitable as it is for
keeping the hierarchical meaning of dignity as elevated position.
Nevertheless, an explanation of human dignity as a moral status avoids these ap-
parent difficulties since status is properly understood as a threshold concept, not
a scalar one.45As such, moral status is ascribed to a group of beings because of
certain features they possess, regardless of the lesser or greater degree to which
such beings have them. Reaching a threshold, i.e. being in possession of certain
traits or features, is a sufficient condition for having the appropriate status.As-
signed on the basis of the relevant properties, X has (or does not have) a certain
status, but X cannot have more or less of it. So there are no scales or degrees in
the enjoyment of status. A completely different thing is that beings having dif-
ferent features enjoy different moral statuses.As noted before, we use the notion
assuming that there may be a plurality of statuses. Furthermore, in order to grasp
human dignity as moral status, we assume that there must be a hierarchy within
the plurality of moral statuses, arranging beings in higher or lower ranks because
of their features. So, the scale exists between different types of status, but not
within them.
Needless to say, the hierarchy of moral statuses expresses distinction according
to an order of importance. There is a strong intuition behind this hierarchy, as
Frances Kamm points out: “the more important an entity is, the more matters
how one treats it”.46 In this sense, the status always displays, albeit indirectly,
how valuable is the entity in comparison with others. But this worth is seen
through the constraints that we should consider when dealing with it. If the moral
status of X is defined as the treatment we owe to X, or what is morally allowed
or not allowed to do to X, the lowest status would be equivalent to a lack of sta-
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1tus, since it would be morally permissible to do anything to X. By contrast, the
higher the status of X, the more constraints on how X should be treated.
Thus, the practical force of a moral status lies in a set of constraints on behav-
iour. In other words, moral status is better explained in terms of rights and du-
ties. Talking about human dignity in the context of human rights, this sounds
quite natural.As mentioned above, the popularity of the notion of human dignity
in the decades after the SecondWorldWar is inextricably linked to human rights.
However, it is worth noticing that this association has not been always so close
as it is today.As we have seen, traditionally the idea of human dignity took shape
in a perfectionist cast and related to duties rather than rights. Furthermore, re-
calling the traditional paradigm is not just a historical curiosity, for some current
uses of human dignity call to mind that traditional sense. Otherwise, focusing ex-
clusively on the relationship with rights, we risk leaving out of sight the most
controversial issues about dignity nowadays.
Thus, legal scholars as Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez reports a significant trend
in the legal understanding of human dignity today: “a critical enhancement of the
HDP’s (human dignity principle) obligations-grounding function, to the detri-
ment of its rights founding one”.47 She sees this trend as a major shift that de-
parts from the use of human dignity in human rights discourse after Second
World War, representing a return to the old Roman sense of dignitas. Or, as she
says, the legal morphing of human dignity in “human dignitas”, because the fin-
de-siècle usage shares with the ancient dignitas two features: first, a similar func-
tion of grounding obligations, and remarkably duties towards oneself; second, the
same régime of inalienability. Well understood, the crucial point in her account
is the statutory conception of dignity, that is, presenting humanity as a status and
every human being as depositary of it.
From a historical point of view, what is missing in her account is the traditional
paradigm, where dignity of man was seen as high rank or status in the world
order, similar to an entrusted office that comes with responsibilities and duties.
Indeed, the features of fin-de-siècle dignity highlighted by Hennette-Vauchez
correspond neatly to that traditional understanding and her discussion reveals
that it never faded away. Rather, it is quite recognizable in current discussions,
and not just in jurisprudence and legal scholarship. Considering the current con-
troversies on the use of dignity in bioethics, it is easy to hold the suspicion that
the source of troubles is not the concept’s lack of clarity, but precisely the reap-
praisal of the traditional sense, enhancing constraints on detriment of autonomy.
If so, there is an important lesson to be drawn. The explanation of human dignity
as a high moral status, well anchored in history, does not go into details and leaves
undecided the crucial issue of how to understand accurately the moral significance
of this status. So, appeals to human dignity do not resolve problems at all.The fact,
patentinbioethicaldebates,isthattherearedifferentinterpretationsatstake;toput
it blatantly, more rights-oriented versus enforcing-duties (even against oneself) ap-
proaches.Thisexplainswhyforexampleincontroversiesaboutdignifieddeathand
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1euthanasia appeals to human dignity can be found on both sides. Understood as a
moral status, whose content is open to disagreement, there is reason to doubt that
it could count as rock-bottom truth in moral discussions.
7.DIGNITY AND RIGHTS
Our concern, however, was to deal with the concept of human dignity in human
rights discourse.Therefore, we should turn now to comment on the link between
human dignity as a high moral status and rights to wonder how exactly they are
related and whether the concept of human dignity can be taken as the foundation
for human rights, as it is usually argued.
Of course, status and rights are closely-related notions. Judith Jarvis Thomson
once said that having a right is to have some kind of status48. But it is perfectly
possible to turn her sentence the other way around and say that having a status
is to have some kind of rights. Both notions are spelled out in terms of con-
straints on behaviour. For instance, take the right-claim that X has againstY that
Y does P. The claim means that Y is under a duty towards X, namely to do P.
Rights are then regarded as duties owed to a rights holder.49 The same goes for
status.As said above, the status of X determines how X should be treated, namely
what is permissible or impermisible to do to X. All this is naturally formulated
in terms of rights.The treatment due to X corresponds to the duties other agents
owe to X, or, correlatively, to the rights that X has against other agents.
Hence the close link we assume between status and rights.That way it is easy to
think about the latter as a sort of boundary or “protective perimeter”, adapting
Hart’s aptly phrase. Indeed, this protective perimeter delineates the idea of per-
sonal inviolability guaranteed by rights that contemporary authors identify with
the very concept of moral status.50To be more precise, the degree of inviolabil-
ity is contingent on the kind of status, higher or lower. So, the higher the status,
the greater and the stronger will be the protective perimeter, namely the number
and stringency of rights ensuring the inviolability of the holder.51
Following a suggestion by Nagel, we take rights as aspects of status, since they
express that kind of inviolability, i.e., the place that the rights holder should oc-
cupy within the moral (or legal, in the case of legal rights and legal status) com-
munity.52 So considered, the link between human rights and dignity is even closer
because the different human rights set forth by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and subsequent international treaties have to be seen as con-
stituents of the highest moral status called “human dignity”. If so, they are not
two separate things, for human rights are the features delineating and compos-
ing that status. Plainly, the protective perimeter defines what counts as high sta-
tus and inviolability.
Nevertheless, this changes the usual account of how dignity and human rights are
related. Understood as a moral status, dignity cannot be seen as a separate ground
for human rights. Of course, we may go on saying that human rights derive from
dignity, but it is a rough way of speaking, pointing out simply that the two no-
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1tions are interdependent. It is true that people have those rights because they
have dignity, but the claim works the other way around too: they have that sta-
tus because they have the rights protecting their personal inviolability and im-
posing constraints on how they should be treated. That way it is not something
previous or antecedent, as it is suggested when dignity is presented as the sort
of separate value upon which the ultimate justification of human rights rests.
Hence, apparently, the notion of dignity looks redundant when referred to human
rights.53 Is it really so? Joel Feinberg in his essay on the nature and value of rights
seems to hold a similar view. For him rights have a special moral significance as
claims against others. They are moral devices well suited “to be claimed, de-
manded, affirmed, insisted upon”. For this reason, they are closely connected
with “the customary rhetoric about what is to be a human being”, which includes
ideas such as respect for persons and the dignity of human beings. Moreover, ac-
cording to him, what is essential in these notions can be reduced to the idea of
having rights:
“Indeed respect for persons (this an intriguing idea) may sim-
ply be respect for their rights, so that there cannot be the one
without the other; and what is called ‘human dignity’may sim-
ply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims.To respect a
person then, or to think of him as possessed of human dignity,
is to think of him as a potential maker of claims”.54
However, Feinberg adds something that we should not overlook.As he says, there
are facts about possessing rights that explain their greatest moral significance,
but cannot be packed in the definition of rights. He highlights one of these facts
as especially remarkable: “Having rights enables us to ‘stand up like men’, to
look others in the eyes, and to feel in some fundamental way as the equal of any-
one”.55 It is not coincidental that his words evoke accurately the upright bearing,
the independent and self-assured attitude traditionally associated with dignity.
For they convey what is the point of having rights and that is just what the con-
cept of dignity, regarded as high moral status, is meant for.
In this sense dignity can be taken as a fundamental concept in human rights dis-
course. Of course, this is not to say that it is an indefinable notion and other
terms should be defined in relation to it, for we have seen that human dignity can
be spelt out in terms of duties. Nor is it the case that statements containing the
notion are taken as basic premises from which all other statements derive. It is
just to say that statements on dignity should be regarded as catching what is the
point of human rights56.
The idea of human dignity is not redundant as far as it expresses the moral sig-
nificance of being in possession of a set of rights ensuring the inviolability, in-
dependence and equal standing of human beings. Human dignity plays a
distinctive moral role in human rights discourse, showing their sense or purpose:
they form the moral status that people have by virtue of their humanity. Other-
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1wise, they would be a disparate list of rights.As we have seen, the decisive con-
tribution of the concept of dignity in relation to human rights is to convey two
things: that all human beings enjoy the same moral status and that this moral
status is very high. Indeed, it means that human beings occupy the uppermost
point in the hierarchy of moral statuses, thereby guaranteeing them a high degree
of protection and inviolability.
According to its hierarchical background, dignity implies that all human beings
deserve respect and deferential treatment, because of the noble and elevated
moral position they occupy. Human rights come to translate this deferential treat-
ment in different normative requirements. In this respect, the concept of dignity
plays a guiding or regulatory role in human rights theory and practice.The treat-
ment due to a high status may vary in response to changing historical circum-
stances, but the idea of high-ranking status can guide the search, selection and
adjustment of various rights, as well as weighing their relative importance in the
whole scheme.
Obviously, human dignity is a moral status because it does not depend on posi-
tive law, but on sound moral arguments. Besides, in the context of human rights
discourse it is chiefly a political claim, namely that a just social order should be
organized as a single high-rank society, guaranteeing the same inviolability and
high regard to all its members because of this shared upper status.
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